I. LAYING PLANS

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I. LAYING PLANS

Sun Tzu[i]

1. Sun Tzu said: The art of war is of vital importance to the State.

  • China desires to be a global power[ii].

2. It is a matter of life and death, a road either to safety or to ruin. Hence it is a subject of inquiry which can on no account be neglected.

  • With BRI plan comes turbulence challenging the current global status quo, and if perceived too much of a direct threat, thermal runaway may ensue, and conflict erupts. Some refer to such instances as the Thucydides Trap[iii]. Global stability may be at stake. Understanding, wisdom, communication is required to avert global conflict.

 

  • Alleged perspective of two Chinese military officers regarding war circa 1999 - P 6 - 7

 

    • Warfare will always exist. But, future warfare will be more complex, widespread and clandestine. So, while violence may decrease in terms of direct military power projection, there will be an increase in political, economic and technologically-based forms of warfare.[iv]

10. By method and discipline are to be understood the marshaling of the army in its proper subdivisions, the graduations of rank among the officers, the maintenance of roads by which supplies may reach the army, and the control of military expenditure.

  • This section addresses the concept and means of logistics, capacity generation/scaling, sustainment, infrastructure development etc to enable power projection
  • P 206 "beyond-limits combined war." [v]
    • Omnidirectionality- is the concept of no-limits warfare. Any means, methods and or resources that facilitate China’s goals are on the table as an option for employment. It’s no longer about air, land, sea and space, but also culture, politics perceptions, etc.[vi]
    • Synchrony-refers to mostly to a concept of “informatized war”, whereby there is total environmental awareness and an ability to engage targets from distant locations.[vii] [viii] [ix]. This concept applies particularly to cyber warfare which is not restricted by recognized military spatial concepts such as areas of operation, areas of influence and areas of interest…the Chinese concept supersedes and dominates all of them. The concept of phasing operations is made obsolete.
      • Think of China’s hybrid STRATCOM/CYBERCOM entity- the Strategic Support Force (SSF), ‘smart cities’, ‘safe cities’, state owned enterprises support Chinese government infrastructure e.g. information technology, etc.
    • Limited objectives- this concept is like the U.S. concept of not outrunning your logistics lines. It also applies to avoiding the U.S trap of mission creep. China calls for disciplined scaling of capabilities by reinforcing successes and building from them, rather than keep changing objectives which can lead to cost overruns, overextending capabilities, and/or losing site of the primary objectives needed to be achieve.   
    • Unlimited measures- china appears to focus their measures to achieve desired effects. All resources and capacity goes to achieving that effect before channeling energies and resources elsewhere.
    • Asymmetry- China believes in applying strengths toward enemy weaknesses. China will avoid direct confrontation whenever able and will instead look for way to identify/create new opportunities to leverage their strengths against the opposition’s weakness. This approach saves energy, resources and time to move onto the next objective(s). 
    • Minimal consumption- Again, China refers to warfighting concepts similar to what’s identified in the Maneuver Warfare Handbook, by William Lind. China regards the application of minimal resources to accomplish objectives in the shortest amount of time…specifically, regarding the concept of ‘blitzkrieg’ as a most powerful weapon. The concept of blitzkrieg exploits time, space and perception via bold decisive action. But, to be successful in blitzkrieg, China understands the importance of having established infrastructure and an intuitive feel for the environment in order to facilitate economy of force operational execution. Is this why China works extremely hard at developing and securing global information technology infrastructures to assure and support ‘informatized war’? [x]
    • Multidimensional coordination- China is looks at warfare to go beyond diplomatic, informational, economic and military means. China may also consider ‘intangible strategic resources’ such as geography, culture, history, social perceptions, etc.  This goes beyond considering a whole of government approach to a whole of society approach.[xi]
    • Adjustment and control of the entire process- Some Chinese military leaders recognize warfare is dynamic. While technology may help reduce uncertainty, creativity and adaptability is needed to secure a win.  In this passage, the Chinese officers recognize the importance of intuition in decision-making to maintain the initiative.  China’s focus on ‘informatized war’ may still serve a part of this not only via cyber, space and electronic warfare means, but through Artificial Intelligence (AI). China allegedly seek AI to “autonomous and swarm intelligence”.[xii] [xiii]

17. According as circumstances are favorable, one should modify one's plans.

  • P 206 In terms of beyond-limits warfare, there is no longer any distinction between what is or is not the battlefield. Spaces in nature including the ground, the seas, the air, and outer space are battlefields, but social spaces such as the military, politics, economics, culture, and the psyche are also battlefields. And the technological space linking these two great spaces is even more sothe battlefield over which all antagonists spare no effort in contending. [3] Warfare can be military, or it can be quasi-military, or it can be non-military.
    • China’s possible primary means to manage this issue is the creation of their Strategic Support Force and the civilian/military infrastructure from which it may feed itself.[xiv] [xv]

18. All warfare is based on deception.

  • P 1. China is a strategic competitor using predatory economics to intimidate its neighbors while militarizing features in the South China Sea. [xvi]
  • P 2. It is increasingly clear that China and Russia want to shape a world consistent with their authoritarian model—gaining veto authority over other nations’ economic, diplomatic, and security decisions.[xvii]
  • China feeling it cannot compete with global powers on its own terms developed and implemented plans and concepts to change the calculus via overt means, but with possible covert intent, via innovative practices and means over the several decades[xviii] [xix] [xx] [xxi] [xxii]. One such plan holds various names, that plan is the Bridge Road Initiative (BRI) [xxiii].

19. Hence, when able to attack, we must seem unable; when using our forces, we must seem inactive; when we are near, we must make the enemy believe we are far away; when far away, we must make him believe we are near.

  • P 113, The two PLA officers took note of a US Army officer’s assessment that China will be unable to revolutionize its military in the 21st century.
    • [30] At the Strategy Conference held by the United States Army War College in April 1996, Army Lieutenant Colonel Lonnie Henley wrote a paper for a report entitled 21st Century China: Strategic Partner... or Opponent. The conclusion was: "In at least the first 25 years of the next century, China will be unable to carry out a military revolution." (See the Foreign Military Data of the Military Science Academy Foreign Military Research Department, June 1997.)[xxiv]

20. Hold out baits to entice the enemy. Feign disorder, and crush him.

  • P 2. As China continues its economic and military ascendance, asserting power through an all-of-nation long-term strategy, it will continue to pursue a military modernization program that seeks Indo-Pacific regional hegemony in the near-term and displacement of the United States to achieve global preeminence in the future.[xxv]
  • P 2. Both revisionist powers and rogue regimes are competing across all dimensions of power. They have increased efforts short of armed conflict by expanding coercion to new fronts, violating principles of sovereignty, exploiting ambiguity, and deliberately blurring the lines between civil and military goals.[xxvi]

23. If he is taking his ease, give him no rest. If his forces are united, separate them.

  • P 80; two Chinese officers specifically noted that U.S. power projection can only be achieved through the development and maintenance of strong alliances. Without alliances, the U.S. is vulnerable and cannot conduct and/or sustain large-scale military, logistics, diplomatic, economic operations.
    • Other than in small operations, the option of 'going it alone' is basically unworkable, and all diplomatic and defense policy decisions must be based on this understanding.".

24. Attack him where he is unprepared, appear where you are not expected.

  • P 27-28 – Two Chinese military officers took specific note in 1999 that future warfare will shift from bloodshed and focus on is heading toward the technological and “new political concepts” integrating international economics, social and political forces. Of specific note, the officers recognize the importance of securing the technological edge.[xxvii]
    • At the same time, technological progress has given us the means to strike at the enemy's nerve center directly without harming other things, giving us numerous new options for achieving victory, and all these make people believe that the best way to achieve victory is to control, not to kill. There have been changes in the concept of war and the concept of weapons, and the approach of using uncontrolled slaughter to force the enemy into unconditional surrender has now become the relic of a bygone age. Warfare has now taken leave of the meat-grinder age of Verdun-like campaigns.[xxviii]

25. These military devices, leading to victory, must not be divulged beforehand.

  • P 152
    • Chapter 6: Seeking Rules of Victory: The Force Moves Away From the Point of the Enemy's Attack [pp. 164-194 in original] "I usually make surprising moves; the enemy expects surprising moves; but I move in an unsurprising manner this time to attack the enemy. I usually make unsurprising moves; the enemy expects unsurprising moves; but I move in a surprising manner this time to attack the enemy." --Li Shimin [xxix]

26. Now the general who wins a battle makes many calculations in his temple ere the battle is fought. The general who loses a battle makes but few calculations beforehand. Thus do many calculations lead to victory, and few calculations to defeat: how much more no calculation at all! It is by attention to this point that I can foresee who is likely to win or lose.

  • P 181 - This narrow sense of the concept of combinations is, of course, very inadequate for today. He who wants to win today's wars, or those of tomorrow, to have victory firmly in his grasp, must "combine" all of the resources of war which he has at his disposal and use them as means to prosecute the war. And even this will not be enough. He must combine them according to the demands of the rules of victory. Even this will still not be enough, because the rules of victory cannot guarantee that victory will drop like ripe fruit into a basket. It still needs a skilled hand to pluck it. That hand is the concept of "going beyond limits," surpassing all boundaries and conforming with the laws of victory when conducting warfare with combinations. Thus we obtain a complete concept, a completely new method of warfare called" modified combined war that goes beyond limits." [ "pian zheng shi chao xian zuhe zhan" 0252 2973 1709 6389 7098 4809 0678 2069][xxx]
  • P 182 This is our definition of "combined war that goes beyond limits."[xxxi]
  • P 183 In view of this, we list "supra-national combinations" as being among the essential factors of warfare that exceeds limits. In this world of mutually penetrating political, economic, ideological, technical, and cultural influences, with networks, clones, Hollywood, hot girls [la mei 6584 1188 – internet pornography], and the World Cup easily bypassing territorial boundary markers, it is very hard to realize hopes of assuring security and pursuing interests in a purely national sense. Only a fool like Saddam Hussein would seek to fulfill his own wild ambition by outright territorial occupation. Facts make it clear that acting in this way in the closing years of the 20th Century is clearly behind the times, and will certainly lead to defeat. Also pursuing its national security and national interests, as a mature great power the United States appeared much smarter than Iraq.[xxxii]
  • P 185 This method, resolving conflicts or conducting warfare not just with national power, but also with combinations of supra-national, trans-national, and non-state power, is what we mean by the general term supra-national combinations. From an examination of some prior, successful examples it can be foreseen that from now on, supranational combinations will be a country's most powerful weapon in attempting to accomplish national security objectives and secure strategic interests within a scope larger than the country itself.[8 ] As the world's only world-class superpower, the United States is the best at using supra-national combinations as a weapon. The United States never misses any opportunity to take a hand in international organizations involving U.S. interests. Another way to put it is that the United States consistently sees the actions of all international organizations as being closely related to U.S. interests. No matter whether the nature of the international organization is European, American, Asian, for some other region, or worldwide, the United States always strives to get involved in it, and manipulate it. The 1996 U.S. Department of Defense Report put it straightforwardly, "To protect and achieve U.S. interests, the U.S. Government must have the capability to influence the policies and actions of other countries. This requires the United States to maintain its overseas involvement, especially in those areas in which the most important interests of the United States are endangered."[9 ] For example, regarding the establishment of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation organization, the initial idea of its conceptualizer, Australian Prime Minister Hawke, was that it would only include Asian countries, Australia, and New Zealand.[xxxiii]

 

 


[i] The Project Gutenberg eBook of The Art of War, by Sun Zu. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://www.gutenberg.org/files/17405/17405-h/17405-h.htm accessed 6Apr19

[ii] U.S. Department of Defense. 2018. Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy - Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge. https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf ; access 7Apr19

[iii] Ted.com. Sep 2018. Graham Allison- We the Future - Is war between China and the US inevitable? https://www.ted.com/talks/graham_allison_is_war_between_china_and_the_us_inevitable/up-next?language=en ; accessed 7Apr19

[vi] Liang, Qiao and Wang Xiangsui. 1999. Unrestricted Warfare. https://archive.org/stream/Unrestricted_Warfare_Qiao_Liang_and_Wang_Xiangsui/Unrestricted_Warfare_Qiao_Liang_and_Wang_Xiangsui_djvu.txt ; accessed 7Apr19

[vii] Liang, Qiao and Wang Xiangsui. 1999. Unrestricted Warfare. https://archive.org/stream/Unrestricted_Warfare_Qiao_Liang_and_Wang_Xiangsui/Unrestricted_Warfare_Qiao_Liang_and_Wang_Xiangsui_djvu.txt ; accessed 7Apr19

[viii] Costello, J., and J. McReynolds. "Institute for National Strategic Studies - CHINA STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVES 13 - China’s Strategic Support Force: A Force for a New Era." National Defense University Press (NDU Press), Oct. 2018, ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratperspective/china/china-perspectives_13.pdf. Accessed 8 Apr. 2019.

[ix] "Annual Report to Congress - Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2018." U.S. Department of Defense. Last modified May 16, 2018. https://media.defense.gov/2018/Aug/16/2001955282/-1/-1/1/2018-CHINA-MILITARY-POWER-REPORT.PDF.

[x] "Annual Report to Congress - Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2018." U.S. Department of Defense. Last modified May 16, 2018. https://media.defense.gov/2018/Aug/16/2001955282/-1/-1/1/2018-CHINA-MILITARY-POWER-REPORT.PDF.

[xi] Liang, Qiao and Wang Xiangsui. 1999. Unrestricted Warfare. https://archive.org/stream/Unrestricted_Warfare_Qiao_Liang_and_Wang_Xiangsui/Unrestricted_Warfare_Qiao_Liang_and_Wang_Xiangsui_djvu.txt

[xii] Liang, Qiao and Wang Xiangsui. 1999. Unrestricted Warfare. https://archive.org/stream/Unrestricted_Warfare_Qiao_Liang_and_Wang_Xiangsui/Unrestricted_Warfare_Qiao_Liang_and_Wang_Xiangsui_djvu.txt

[xiii] "Annual Report to Congress - Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2018." U.S. Department of Defense. Last modified May 16, 2018. https://media.defense.gov/2018/Aug/16/2001955282/-1/-1/1/2018-CHINA-MILITARY-POWER-REPORT.PDF.

[xiv]   Costello, J., and J. McReynolds. "Institute for National Strategic Studies - CHINA STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVES 13 - China’s Strategic Support Force: A Force for a New Era." National Defense University Press (NDU Press), Oct. 2018, ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratperspective/china/china-perspectives_13.pdf. Accessed 8 Apr. 2019.

[xv]   "Annual Report to Congress - Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2018." U.S. Department of Defense. Last modified May 16, 2018. https://media.defense.gov/2018/Aug/16/2001955282/-1/-1/1/2018-CHINA-MILITARY-POWER-REPORT.PDF.

[xvi]   U.S. Department of Defense. 2018. Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy - Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge. https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf ; access 7Apr19

[xvii] U.S. Department of Defense. 2018. Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy - Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge. https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf ; access 7Apr19

[xviii] U.S. Department of Defense. 2018. Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy - Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge. https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf ; access 7Apr19

[xix] Wikipedia. 1999. Unrestricted Warfare; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unrestricted_Warfare ; accessed 7Apr19

[xxi] USCC.Nov2018. 2018 Report to Congress of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/annual_reports/Executive%20Summary%202018%20Annual%20Report%20to%20Congress.pdf ; Related video: https://www.senate.gov/isvp/?type=live&comm=uscc&filename=uscc111418 ; accessed 6Apr19  

[xxv]   U.S. Department of Defense. 2018. Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy - Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge. https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf ; access 7Apr19

[xxvi] U.S. Department of Defense. 2018. Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy - Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge. https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf ; access 7Apr19

[xxx] Liang, Qiao and Wang Xiangsui. 1999. Unrestricted Warfare. https://archive.org/stream/Unrestricted_Warfare_Qiao_Liang_and_Wang_Xiangsui/Unrestricted_Warfare_Qiao_Liang_and_Wang_Xiangsui_djvu.txt ; accessed 7Apr19

[xxxi] Liang, Qiao and Wang Xiangsui. 1999. Unrestricted Warfare. https://archive.org/stream/Unrestricted_Warfare_Qiao_Liang_and_Wang_Xiangsui/Unrestricted_Warfare_Qiao_Liang_and_Wang_Xiangsui_djvu.txt ; accessed 7Apr19

[xxxii] Liang, Qiao and Wang Xiangsui. 1999. Unrestricted Warfare. https://archive.org/stream/Unrestricted_Warfare_Qiao_Liang_and_Wang_Xiangsui/Unrestricted_Warfare_Qiao_Liang_and_Wang_Xiangsui_djvu.txt ; accessed 7Apr19

[xxxiii] Liang, Qiao and Wang Xiangsui. 1999. Unrestricted Warfare. https://archive.org/stream/Unrestricted_Warfare_Qiao_Liang_and_Wang_Xiangsui/Unrestricted_Warfare_Qiao_Liang_and_Wang_Xiangsui_djvu.txt ; accessed 7Apr19

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